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What explains support for democracy among Russian youth? Studies in political socialization 
conducted in the early 1990s, incorporating generational change, suggest that Russia’s main 
obstacle to the consolidation of democracy was nostalgia for the Soviet Union. The passing of time 
now allows for the inclusion of the post-Soviet generational cohort, also referred to as the Putin 
Generation. The post-Soviet youth are a byproduct of political instability and economic turmoil with 
little or no direct personal experience of the Soviet period. These developments allow for new 
theoretical mechanisms related to government legitimacy to be included in the analysis. Drawing 
upon 2011 survey data conducted by the World Values Surveys, this article seeks to advance our 
understanding of why generational change affects attitudes toward democracy. It extends the 
literature in two ways: firstly, by adding a new political generation; and secondly, by incorporating 
government legitimacy into the analysis explaining support for democracy. 
 Keywords: Russian Youth, Post-Soviet Generation, Generational Change, Generation Effect, 





Literature on political socialization, specifically, generational change, conducted in the early 1990s 
suggest that Russia’s main obstacle to the consolidation of democracy was nostalgia for the Soviet 
Union.1 Conventional wisdom suggests that younger generations are more inclined to express 
support for democracy. Previously surveyed Russian populations were unique in that they came of 
age under two different socioeconomic and political systems during the nation’s transitional period.  
One study conducted at the turn of the century, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, found 
that younger Russians held a more favorable view of democracy and capitalism than older 
Russians.2 The elapse of time now offers the post-Soviet generational cohort for consideration. This 
article places emphasis on the Putin Generation3, those who have come of age during Putin’s 
presidency (or those born between 1980 and 1992), that is living under the new sociopolitical and 
economic system. In the matter of a decade, the notion of youth in modern-day Russia as a 
subject of government policy is quite different from that of the Soviet Union. Unlike their parents, 
young Russians in the twenty first century do not have an established career trajectory. The new 
Russian youth are a byproduct of political instability and turbulent free-market transition with little 
or no direct experience of the Soviet era.  
 
Drawing upon the political socialization literature, this article seeks to improve the current 
literature’s understanding of the attitudes of the post-Soviet cohort and how the period in which 
they came of age has shaped their outlook on politics and society. Understanding the political 
consciousness of the Putin Generation, which emerged out of political and economic turmoil, and 
how that consciousness was formed gives researchers insight into what kind of citizens young 
Russians will be. This will be the next generation that will occupy various occupations within the 
government, vote in elections, work in the private sector and become academics; they will also 
share their views and opinions with future generations. Additionally, considering Russia’s one-year 
of service obligation, these young men and women are currently or will be active military men and 
women of the state.    
 
Using the 2011 World Values Survey, this article seeks to understand the extent to which 
generational change is affecting demand for democracy. The present analyses, using two OLS 
regression models, reveal that age positively predicts satisfaction with government and demand for 
democracy in only one instance – the Brezhnev Generation. Furthermore, by incorporating 
government legitimacy as a variable, the study reveals that better perceptions of government 
performance positively impacts demand for democracy.   
 
Who are the Post-Soviet Youth? 
 
How have the events of the early 2000s affected the political orientation of Russia’s youth? Though 
there may be debate as to the relative importance of specific developments, the period between 
the late 1990s through the 2000s has been a transformative period. A young Russian born in 1980 
would have been 18 years of age at the time of the financial meltdown of 1998 and 20 years of age 
when Putin became president in 2000 after launching the Second Chechen War. At the other end of 
the post-Soviet cohort, a Russian born in 1992 would have been 12 when Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 
liberal opposition and oil billionaire, was arrested and put on trial. Those born in the early 1980’s 
spent their formative years hearing about the Russian state and Chechen separatist. Further, due 
to rising oil and natural gas prices, the country experienced significant GDP growth throughout the 
2000s. The broader context of the latter half of the transition period provides an interesting case 
                                                          
1 Olena Nikolayenko, 2008 
2 Michael McFaul, “Generational Change in Russia,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, no. 11 (2003): 64-79.    




study to determine how highly visible political and economic events affected the political orientation 
of Russia’s youth.  
 
According to the CIA Factbook, Russian youth (those between 15 and 25) today make up nearly 11 
percent of the population. If combined with the proceeding cohort of young Russians, who have yet 
to come of age, the total is 27 percent or one-fourth of the population. The largest age group is 
made of those between 25 and 55, which accounts for roughly 46 percent of the population. If 
generational change is occurring, those values and beliefs may be reflected in future populations.4    
 
The post-Soviet cohort is the first generation to truly harness the power of the internet, utilizing 
social media sites, such as Vkontakte and Odnoklasniki. 40.8 percent of individuals, in a study 
carried out by Diuk (2010), responded that they use the internet during their leisure time.5 While 
computer utilization has increased, with respect to news source, more than 90% reported that they 
gather news from television.6 The higher percentage suggests that young Russians are formulating 
opinions based on the news controlled by the Putin regime. The means by which young people 




The Russian youth, or generational change, have been considered the “beacon of hope” for 
democracy in Russia. 7 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was the sight of one of 
the world’s most profound sociopolitical and economic transformation in modern history. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that younger people are inherently more progressive than older 
people in terms of their sociopolitical values and beliefs. Generation effect theory suggests that the 
formative period in which an individual comes of age under unique circumstances has the potential 
to shape certain attitudes of a generation; the studied phenomenon is described as a “generation 
effect” or “cohort effect.” 8 Further, in developing countries, such as Russia in the early 1990s, 
periods of dissatisfaction with government performance may affect political system preference,9 
and/or undermine the political efficacy of a democracy.  
 
Mendelson and Gerber (2008), drawing upon survey data from the 2000s, argue that the Putin 
themes, which are resonating with youth, may be acting as an ideological barrier to support for 
democracy.10 Further, the scholars argue that an authoritarian political culture may be developing 
among Russian youth.11 While some evidence of generational change has been found,12 even more 
speculated that the initial optimism about democracy and capitalism would be squashed by 
disappointment.13  
 
The study of political generations and generation effects is contentious. Only highly visible and 
frequently discussed events are likely to resonate with young people. The post-Soviet cohort, as 
noted, came of age during a historical period of Russia’s transition. The socialization literature also 
notes that attitudes have the potential to change over time, especially passes through various 
                                                          
4 CIA Factbook, 2015.   
5 Nadia Diuk, “The Next Generation in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan: Youth, politics, identity, and change,” Plymotuth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, INC, 2010.     
6 Diuk, “Next Generation.” 
7 McFaul, “Generational Change.”  
8 Mark Tessler, Carrie Konold, and Megan Reif, “Political Generations in Developing Countries Evidence and Insights from Algeria.” Public Opinion 
Quarterly, no. 68.2 (2004): 188 
9 Tessler, “Political Generations,” 191. 
10 Mendelson and Gerber, “Anti-American Views of the Putin Generation,” 132. 
11 Mendelson and Gerber. 
12 McFaul, “Generational Change.”  




stages in life, including college, employment, marriage, child-rearing, and retirement.14 The most 
promising area of study on generation effects is in countries that have undergone a period of 
sociopolitical and economic instability.  
 
Those born between 1980 and 1992 constitute as a political generation.15 This cohort passed 
through their formative during a period of nation building, the curtailment of political rights, and 
military conflict. More importantly, the Putin Generation came age during an economic rebound. 
There is reason to believe that the combination of these events have shaped the attitudes towards 
democracy.     
   
Modernization 
 
At the turn of the millennium, nearly a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began 
its rebound from the economic meltdown of 1998. Likely due to the rise in oil and natural gas price, 
between 1999 and 2008 the national GDP grew at an unprecedented rate, with the average at 
more than 7 percent.16 For Putin’s first 8 years in office, Russia had one of the world’s fastest 
growing economies and real wages more than tripled.17 Furthermore, the national unemployment 
rate dropped from 12 percent in 1998 to 6.5 percent in 2011, with the lowest being 6 percent in 
2007.18  
 
Classical modernization theory argues that economic development, greater affluence, and 
urbanization foster support for democracy.19 In this study four indicators of modernization theory 
are considered: size of town20, education level,21 social trust22, and interest in politics.23 Schools, 
namely institutions of higher education, no longer follow the strict teachings of the Soviet doctrine, 
transforming curriculums; therefore higher levels of education may correlate with higher support 
for democracy. Further, the expansion of cities and the migration of people from rural areas to the 
city lead people to adopt new beliefs, facilitated by increasing education level and global 
awareness.24 The aforementioned indicators of modernization diffuse the necessary conditions for 




In 2004, Russia’s freedom rating changed from “partly free” to “not free,” according to Freedom 
House. While most attention has been given to the antidemocratic tendencies of the Putin regime, 
little attention has been given to how government legitimacy impacts demand for democracy in 
Russia. In a learning module approach, in contrast to modernization theory and generation effect 
theory, Mattes and Bratton (2007) argue that demand for democracy is contingent upon the 
perceived supply of democracy rather than affluence and or generational change.25 Data collected 
in 2010 revealed that Russian youth possess more material wealth than any preceding generation 
cohort.26 When asked whether they believe they have the ability to change their circumstance, 72 
                                                          
14 Cooper and Denner 1998; Staudinger, and Lindenberger 1991; Magnunsson, Bergman, and Rudinger 1991, as cited in Tessler et. Al 2004 
15 Diuk,93.   
16 Guriev and Tsyvinski, “Challenges Facing the Russian Economy after the Crisis.” 9-10.  
17 Guriev and Tsyvinski, 9, 12. 
18 International Monetary Fund  
19 Lerner, Traditional Society; Lipset, “Social Requisites”; Inglehart and Norris, “True Clash”. 
20 Lerner, Traditional Society;  Lipset, “Social Requisites”. 
21 Almond and Verba.  
22Lerner, Traditional Society.   
23Lipset, “Social Requisites”; Lerner, Traditional Society  
24 Lerner, D The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Free Press, 1958 





percent responded positively.27 Due to the benefits reaped by the increase in national GDP between 
the years of 1999-2008, Russians may attribute material wealth and economic rebound to 
government policy directed by the Putin regime,28 affecting their perceived supply of democracy. 
Satisfaction with household financial situation is also used as an indicator of government 
legitimacy.   
  
Throughout the 2000s, despite the curtailment of political rights, Putin has enjoyed high approval 
ratings, suggesting that the general population has approved of the government’s performance.29 
In a comparative study from the MENA region, Benstead and Atkeson found that positive 
perceptions of governance (or supply of democracy), in the form of cracking down on corruption, 
within authoritarian regimes also positively relates to demand for democracy.30 If democratic 
regimes cultivate and sustain democracy, it is reasonable to believe that Putin’s authoritarian 
regime is producing similar results, in spite of findings that have found low support for democracy 




Using 2500 interviews from the 2011 World Values Survey, developed by Inglehart at University of 
Michigan, the present study seeks to explain what is affecting demand for greater democracy 
among Russian youth.      
 
Depended variables, in this study, are a series of sociopolitical attitudes relevant to Russia. The 
first dependent variable, government legitimacy, is measured by gauging confidence in the (1) 
government in the nation’s capital, (2) parliament, and (3) civil service. Another dependent 
variable, support for democracy, is measured by asking respondents how important it is for them 
to live in a country that is democratically governed. Respondents are asked to rate the importance 
of democracy on a scale from one to ten, with higher scores denoting greater importance.  
 
Independent variables are dummy variables representing the imagined generation cohorts. 
Adopting a lenient model to test for generation effects employed by Tessler (2004),32 the 
“formative years” are defined as 18-25. Every respondent is assigned to an age cohort that 
corresponds to the historical period based on their age at the time of the 2011 World Values 
Survey interview. For example, the Generation Putin cohort consists of individuals born between 
1980 and 1993, who were between the ages of 18 and 31 at the time of the survey in 2011. With 
the exception of the young Russians born after 1987, six or more years were spent within the 
hypothesized formative period. Generational cohorts can be identified by having shared depositions 
or collective memories that are durable and have the potential to outlast the periods in which they 
were formed, thus shaping the behavior and attitudes of an individual for a lifetime.33 In other 
words, the impact of social and political events experienced during the formative years has the 
potential to define a generation’s outlook on politics and society.  
 
The number of respondents in each age cohort is as follows: Generation Putin, 1998 – 2011, N= 
641; Generation Gorbachev, 1985 - 1997, N= 542; Brezhnev, 1964 -1984; N= 928; Khrushchev, 
1946 - 1966, N= 389.  
                                                          
27 Diuk, 14.  
28 Diuk, 9. 
29Mendelson and Gerber, 136. 
30 Benstead and Atkeson, “Why does Satisfaction with an Authoritarian Regime Increase Support for Democracy?” 
31 Inglehart, “Mass Support for Democracy”.  
32 Rather than dropping respondents who do not fall into a designated eight year historical period based on age, I extend the limits of the age cohorts, 
capturing all attitudes available in the sample.   





Six additional independent variables are also included in the regressions. For the purpose of 
control, gender (male coded as 1) is included in the regression. To test modernization theory, four 
variables are included: education level (no formal education through university, with degree), size 
of town (measured by population size, 0-2000 through greater than 500,000 inhabitants), interest 
in politics, and social trust. Lastly, satisfaction with financial situation of household (1 indicates low 
satisfaction and 10 indicates higher satisfaction), All variables are statistically significant in either 
one or both models. Lastly, A dummy variable (public sector =1) for sector of occupation is also 
included in the regression.     
 
In model 1, the effect of age cohorts on the dependent variable – confidence in government – is 
examined. In the proceeding model, the dependent variable is support for democracy – importance 
of democracy, with the “confidence in government” variable introduced into the regression as an 
independent variable. This will allow us to examine the effect that government legitimacy has on 
demand for democracy.    
 




Table 1 presents the results of the regressions in which “confidence in the government” and 
“importance of democracy” are the dependent variables. Examined through the lens of generation 
effect theory, the relationship between generational cohort and confidence in government, and 
between generational cohort and support for democracy, reveals that Russian youth are not more 
inclined to be more supportive of democracy than previous generations. The findings contradict 
conventional wisdom that suggests that youth are inherently more progressive than their parents 
in terms of embracing democracy.  
 
The table shows that confidence in government and support for democracy is only statistically 
significant related to cohort membership in one instance. Members of Brezhnev generation, or 
those coming of age during the height of the Cold War, are less likely to express confidence in the 
government and more likely to support democracy. This is likely due to the breakdown of 
guarantees offered under the Soviet system. For example, controlling for other factors, the 
Brezhnev generation is .092 units lower in predicted government legitimacy than the Putin cohort 
and the effect is statistically significant (p<.05). In other words, the cohort effect is only discernible 
in the case of the Brezhnev generation. Furthermore, the regression also shows that Russian youth 
take a neutral position with respect to support for democracy.  
Against that backdrop, though some democratic practices have been institutionalized, the fact that 
many fundamental institutions of the Soviet state had not changed may hinder demand for 
democracy.34 The findings suggest that democracy is not in high demand among youth but not 




When concerned with government legitimacy, in the form of confidence in the government, model 
1 shows that government legitimacy is statistically related to two variables: social trust and 
interest in politics. Both are positively related to government legitimacy. The result from Model 1 
shows that the perception of government performances presented by the main media outlets has 
                                                          




been positive, increasing confidence in the government. Speculation is informed by Diuk’s findings 
which found that Russian youth gather nearly 90% of the news from the television.35  
 
Model 2 presents the relationship between support for democracy and modernization, controlling 
for generation and other independent variables. Importance of democracy is positively related to 
education level, size of town, and interest in politics (model 2). However, an inverse relationship 
exists between satisfaction with household-income and support for democracy. A one unit increase 
in education level and population density, support for democracy increases .1 and .08 on a scale of 
1-10, respectively, when controlling for all other factors. The rise in national GDP could explain 
patterns of migration from rural areas to larger cities. In examining the effect of education, as 
education increases by one unit, predicted support for democracy increases .069, all else being 
equal (p<.001). Among Russian youth those who reported having some college-level education or 
obtained a college diploma were more likely to express a preference for a democratic political 
system. With recent reforms to primary education, only 17.7 percent of young Russians describe 
themselves as students in 2010, 3 degrees lower than 2003 levels.36 With the decrease in 
secondary schooling and college enrollment, support for democracy may also decrease.   
 
The information is consistent with previous studies examining the relationship between education 
and city size, suggesting that both variables are indicators of support for democracy. However, 
modernization theory weakens when considering satisfaction with the financial situation of the 
household. Those who positioned themselves higher on the scale are less likely to stress the 




The results, in model 1, show that Russian youth express higher levels of confidence in the 
government than the Brezhnev age cohort. The positive perception of the Putin government, which 
is credited for the stabilization of the national economy, may be due to Russia’s first experiment 
with democracy during the transition period. It is possible that Russian youth heard the horror 
stories of the “crazy 90s” and now draw a connection between a strong leader and a stable 
economy. As expected, size of town and education are not statistically related to confidence in 
government.            
 
In model 2, Russians, who reported being satisfied with the financial situation of their household, 
were less likely to demand democracy. This demonstrates support for the status-quo in Russia. In 
other words, the turbulence of the late 1990s may be affecting demand for democracy.  
Additionally, for those who reported that they work in the public sector, predicted support for 
democracy decreased .22. The findings support an informed speculation about the connection 
between public sector employees and lower support for democracy, seeing that many fundamental 
institutions from the Soviet Union remain intact. While a negative relationship exists between 
satisfaction with financial situation and importance of democracy, the regression reveals a positive 
relationship between regime legitimacy and support for democracy. The more confident a 
respondent was in the government, the higher they position themselves on the importance of 
democracy scale. This is evident in model 2, as confidence in government increases by one unit, 
predicated support for democracy increases .24 on a scale of 1-10. This supports claims that 




                                                          







This present study presents evidence that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, age is not a strong 
predictor of support for democracy. The data shows that Russian youth do not hold more 
progressive views, with respect to democracy, than previous generations, specifically the Brezhnev 
generation. In model 1 and 2, generation effects are discernible in the attitudes of only one age 
cohort. In both instances, the respondents in the Brezhnev age cohort reflected attitudes that set 
them apart from other political generations.   
 
The findings demonstrate how government performance, in form of higher confidence levels, has 
the potential to foster support for democracy in authoritarian regimes. While uncertainty remains 
as to whether Russian youth will continue to be ambivalent about democracy, government 
performance is likely to increase the demand for democracy if the regime is viewed as legitimate.     
 
Since 2011, when the survey data was collected, the Russian people have been experiencing a 
defining period in their nation’s contemporary history. Briefly, and most notably, Putin returned to 
presidency in 2012, further consolidating power, and is expected to remain in power until 2024. 
Domestically, the Putin administration has clamped down on civil society and independent news 
agency, passing more laws that restrict their activities. Abroad, Russia annexed the Crimean 
peninsula following the overthrow of the pro-Russian government in Kiev, Ukraine in 2013 and is 
suspected of providing military support to pro-Russian separatist. Additionally, with an approval 
rating in the 80 degrees, Putin’s rhetoric has become aggressively reminiscent of the Soviet era 
rhetoric.     
 
Additional research is needed to determine whether regime legitimacy/government performance 
will continue to have a positive impact on attitudes toward democracy. Furthermore, research is 
needed to test whether Russia’s political culture is, perhaps, in organically, shifting towards 
authoritarianism, which is not tested for in this investigation. As the current regime expands its 
reach across the social space of civil society, additional attitudinal and behavioral data, specific to 
Russia, could potentially shed light on political, economic, and social beliefs and actions of Russian 
youth. Evidence of generation effects can plausibly emerge if emphasis is placed on other areas 
sociopolitical and economic life. This is essential to understanding whether regime legitimacy, the 
supply of democracy, will continue to lead to greater demand for democracy.       
 
The focus of the study is to test for generation effects in attitudes towards democracy, as well as to 
introduce the government legitimacy variable. Although age alone does not explain variance (and 
only modestly in one case) in support for democracy, the analysis reveals that post-Soviet youth  
are moderate on support for democracy and government legitimacy, in the case of Russia, is 
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Table 1 Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (OLS) 
 Confidence in Government Importance of Democracy 
   
Constant 2.113  5.736 
 (1 through 4) (1 though 10) 
Generation Effect Theory   
Generation Putin (Cohort= 0)   
   
Generation Gorbachev (=1) -.015 .090 
 (.049) (.168) 
Brezhnev (=1) -.092* .361** 
 (.046) (.157) 
Khrushchev (=1) -.087 .207 
 (.065) (.222) 
Modernization Theory   
Size of town -.008 .106*** 
 (.006) (.022) 
Education level -.016 .069*** 
 (.010) (.033) 
Social trust (Trust= 1) .153*** -.060 
 (.038) (.130) 
Interest in politics .068** .233*** 
 (.022) (.082) 
Regime legitimacy   
Satisfaction with financial 




 (.007) (.026) 
Sector of occupation (Public= 
1) 
.071** -.215* 
 (.038) (.129) 
Regime legitimacy N/A .243*** 
  (.081) 
Gender (Male= 1) -.061* -.183 
 (.035) (.121) 
Number of observations 1752 1659 
R-square .037 .036 
Adjusted R-square .032 .030 
   
Note. – Standard errors are in parentheses; dummy variables are marked. 
* Significant at the .10 level. 
** Significant at the .05 level. 





















 Highest level of education attained. No formal education [=1]/ Incomplete primary school 
[=2]/ Complete primary school [=3]/ Incomplete secondary school: technical type [=4]/  
complete secondary school: technical type [=5]/ Incomplete secondary school: university-
preparatory type [=6]/ Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type [=7]/ Some 
university-level education, without degree [=8]/ University-level education, with degree 
[=9]/ 
 Size of city. Eight-point scale, with “under 2,000 [=1]” at the lowest point and “500,000 or 
greater [=8]” at the highest.  
 Social trust. “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you need to be very careful in dealing with people? Most people can be trusted [=1]/ need 
to be very careful [=0].” 
 Interest in politics. “How interested would you say you are in politics? Not at all interested 




 Satisfaction with household income. “How satisfied are you with the financial situation of 
your household?” Ten-point scale, where 10 is the highest.  
 Sector of occupation. Are you working for the government or public institution [=1], for 
private business or industry [=0], or for a private non-profit organization [=0]? 
 Government legitimacy, independent variable for model 2. “How much confidence do you 
have in the government (in your nation’s capital), parliament, and civil service?  None at all 
[=1]/ not very much [=2]/ Quite a lot [=3]/ A great deal [=4].”  
